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ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS
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Elisabeth Kersten~ Director
Octo her 1984

STATE CAPITOL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

1984
Honorable David Roberti, President pro Tempore of the Senate
Honorab
Members of the Ca fornia State Senate
Dear Mr. President and Members:
for your informat
is a report on State Revenue
Losses from Federal Lands,
by the Senate Office of
Research. The report points out that California is losing milof dollars of the state's legally authorized share of
land revenues as a result of federal government mismanagement
intentional federal efforts to reduce the state's
of federal land revenues.
l~out

45% of all land in California is owned by the federal
(over 45
Ilion acres)
and over 59 million acres
lands offshore California's 1100-mile coastl
is
controlled by the federal government. Revenues owed to the U.S.
from offshore energy leasing and onshore minerals
timber
lopment are the second largest source of revenue
by the federal government, exceeded only by federal
taxes. A substantial share of these federal land revenues
red by federal law to be shared with states and
1
For example, in 1983, California's share of onshore fede
revenues exceeded $65 million, with the bulk of the funds
to school districts and counties where the federal lands
are located. And in 1984, the federal government offered Caliover $200 million to settle disputed claims over more than
Ilion in offshore oil revenues.

The report points out that in addition to refusing to provide
California with a fair share of offshore oil revenues, the state
is losing or is threatened with the loss of millions of dollars
in federal land revenues as a result of:
mismanagement~

•

federal mineral royalty

•

mineral leasing •lottery• scandals;

•

federal agency •undervaluation• of gas production;

•

illegal deductions of federal "windfall profits• taxes from
state revenue shares;

•

federal proposals to reduce the state share of revenues from
federal land timber harvesting and grazing~ and

•

federal government use of •appropriation bills• to circumvent
federal land laws requiring state revenue sharing.

It is important that the Legislature help guard against the
erosion of the state's legally authorized share of federal land
revenues.
In particular, counties and school districts dependent
on federal land revenues will be significantly harmed if revenue
sharing reductions continue. The report includes a number of
detailed proposals to address particular revenue sharing problems
associated with federal offshore energy, onshore minerals, and
timber and rangeland activities.
In addition, the report
includes general recommendations to establish a comprehensive
state mechanism to monitor and influence federal land decisions
having major land use and fiscal impacts in California by creating a:
I.
II.

FEDERAL LANDS COORDINATION OFFICE, and
FEDERAL LANDS ADVISORY COUNCIL

If you have any questions about the report, please contact
Michael Shapiro in the Senate Office of Research (916) 445-1727.

~~
ROBERT
. PRESLE
Chairman, Senat
Natural Resources
and Wildlife
Committee

BARRY KEENE
Chairman, Joint Committee on Fisheries
and Aquaculture

ELISABETH KERSTEN
Director, Senate Office of Research

iii (} ~.--

..c..

RAY JOHfsON
Chairman, Select
Committee on Forest
Land Issues
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October 25, 1984
STATE REVENUE LOSSES FROM OFFSHORE AND ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS
Report Corrections

(Errata Sheet forthcoming)

State revenue receipts were understated
Corrections
Transmittal Letter--1st page: Change $65 million to $78 million
P. 4

Change $55 million to $68 million

P. 6

Change $55.6 million to $68.75 million
Equals the sum of: Forest revenues-Minerals
Grazing
Total

$43
$25.6
$ .15
$68.75

million (p. 29)
million (p. 19)
million (p. 32)
million

P. 6

Change $65.6 million to $78.85 million

P. 7

County Distribution Table is incorrect--understates funds.
New table being developed.

Addtional copies of this publication may be purchased for $5.50
per copy from: JOINT PUBLICATIONS OFFICE, Box 90, State Capitol,
Sacramento, CA 95814. Please add 6% sales tax. Make checks
payable to STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
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COUNTY FEDERAL ACREAGES

County

Total
Land Area
In Acres

Alameda
Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Contra Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Imperial
In yo
Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Madera
Marin
Mariposa
Mendocino
Merced
Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Napa
Nevada
Orange
Placer
Plumas
Riverside
Sacramento
San Benito
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Solano
Sonoma
Stanislaus
Sutter
Tehama
Trinity
Tulare
Tuolumne
Ventura
Yolo
Yuba

469,120
462,720
379,520
1,064,320
657,280
737,920
469,760
641,920
1,096,960
3,816,960
842,880
2,286,720
2,741,760
6,458,240
5,217,280
892,800
803,840
2,910,080
2,598,400
1,372,160
332,800
931,200
2,244,480
1,268,480
2,618,880
1,937,920
2,127,360
485,120
625,920
500,480
911,360
1,644,880
4,593,280
629,120
893,440
12,883,840
2,723,300
28,800
901,760
2,122,240
290,560
1,752,320
833,280
280,960
2,430,720
613,120
4,039,680
529,280
1,010,560
960,000
388,480
1,904,640
2,042,240
3,096,320
1,455,360
1,184,640
661,760
407,680

Total

100,206,720

============
-2-

Federal
OWners hiE

6,178
425,926
76,987
151,199
128,553
111,396
9, 722
451,743
513,830
1,476,894
217,127
436,133
1,499,402
5,172,135
1,246,329
20,913
351,170
1,771,503
763,237
545,661
11,572
443,867
310,489
24,803
1,729,305
1,452,195
588,387
72,754
159,486
64,808
298,532
1,150,229
2,489,120
15,279
115,039
9,619,763
750,693
4,224
9,854
308,360
275
838,546
10,717
152
978,474
374,539
2,516,444
15,553
12,355
16,367
2,592
460,159
1,465,593
1,558,008
1,089,238
621,395
31,510
86,352
45,076,382

==========

% of County
OWned by
Government
1. 317%
94.08
20.29
14.21
19.56
15.10
2.07
70.37
46.84
38.69
25.76
19.07
54.69
80.09
23.89
2.342
43.69
60.87
29.37
39.77
3. 477
47.67
13.83
1. 955
66.03
74.94
27.66
15.00
25.48
12.95
32.76
69.93
54.19
2.429
12.88
74.67
27.57
14.67
1. 093
14.53
.0946
47.85
1. 286
.0541
40.25
61.09
62.29
2.939
1.223
1. 705
.6672
24.16
71.76
50.32
74.84
52.45
4.762
21.18

44.98%

======

INTRODUCTION AND

I

recent

SUMMARY

i

Western states,
with major

1 land use battles such as the

Rebe lion" (the
le to secure state ownership of
1
1 lands) ,
the "Seaweed Rebellion" (confl
coastal states and the
1 government over offshore energy
2 11
deve
),
zation" (opposition to the current Administration's

mass

sale of federal lands to private
s to reduce the national debt) , 3 and "firesale leasing"

(contesting a major expans

and acceleration of federal mineral
4
leasing, which floods the market and generates low bids) .
These
skirmi

s over

have sometimes obscured the equal

1 problem of federal

"Sagebrush and Seaweed Rebellions"

federal land laws.
are on hold, and "privatizat
in check,

crit

on state revenue shares guaranteed under

seal ra

i

sposal and development

1 land ownership,

immed

te challenge

public land states is
, namely

le leasing" temporar-

" and "

ing California and other

a stop to "Seaweed and Sagebrush
government actions which are resulting

s to states of mi lions of dol

z

share of

s of their legal

1 land revenues.

federal government dominates land ownership in Cali45% of all land
federal government {see map

Cali

is owned by

low), the bulk of which is managed

Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (over 19 million acres of nat

1 forests) and the Department of the Interi-

or s Bureau of Land Management (over 16 million acres of public
lands).

In addition, the Department of the Interior's Minerals

Management
ral

controls over 59 million acres of offshore
ifornia's entire 1100-mile coast.

rally-owned land generates s
1

Much of

ficant revenues for the

PUBLIC LANDS
CALIFORNIA

.:

-

LEGEND
BLM OFFICE
CONSERVATION AREA BOUNDARY

c:::J PUBLIC LAND
NATIONAL FOREST
NATIONAL PARK & MONUMENT
MILITARY RESERVATION

c:::J INDIAN RESERVATION
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE
SCALE

.,..

0

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

NOVE.MIEJt.

1979

Revenues owed to

u.s.

gas, and onshore fuel

rnment for offshore oil and
lizer minerals, t

federal land resources are the second

st source of revenue

the federal government receives, exceeded
taxes.

r, and other

by federal income

A substantial share of this federal land revenue is
by federal law to

with states.

of federal legislation have

Several pieces

enacted to compensate states for

the burdens imposed by tax-exempt federal property.

They fall

into two
1.

Federal land revenue sharing programs, and

2.

Payments in lieu of taxes.

For example, in the federal land revenue sharing area,
Cali

is entitled to a share of federal offshore oil

revenues

was recent

offered over

200 million to settle

disputed claims over more than $1 billion in revenues.

Further-

more, in federal fiscal year (FY) 1983, California received over
55 million from the federal government as its share of revenues
generated by onshore oil, gas, and geothermal leasing, timber
sa
n

s, grazing fees, and other uses of federal

s in Cali

, with the bulk of the funds going to school

s

s where the federal lands are located.
In the category of payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) , local
governments in California received over $10 million in 1983.
The Cali

a payments are part of a national PILT program to
federal land revenue sharing payments to

1 gov-

ernments to compensate in part for property tax revenues lost
se of the presence of federal tax-exempt property. 6
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Federal Law/Agency

Type of Receipts

State Share

California Law

Mineral Leasing Act

Revenues received from
mineral leasing (oil, gas,
geothermal, potash, etc.)

50'\

Fublic Resources Code (PRC) 2795-·the first $1.1 mill ion to be deposited in

(30

u.s.c.

191)

Bureau of Land Management

state

Surface Mining and Reclamation Account

PRC 3821--requires 40\ of the state's share of geothermal revenues to go to
counties of origin for geothermal related activities
PRC 3822--requires 30'\ of geothermal revenues to be granted or loaned by the
Energy Commission to local governments for geothermal projects
PRC 3825·-requires 30% of geothermal revenues to go to the Renewable Resources
Investment Fund (PRC 34000) for natural resource and wildlife projects
PRC 12304-07·-requires federal potash and potassium revenues to be distributed to
affected school districts and community colleges
Education Code 12320--all other Mineral Leasing Act monies go to the State School Fund

National Forest
Management

Monies received

25\ to

from

counties

Government Code 29484·-apportioned 50\ to county school service funds and
50\ for county roads

(16 u.s.c. 500)
U.S. Forest Service

National Forests
(timber sales,
recreation fees)

Taylor Grazing Act
(43 u.s.c. 3151)
Bureau of Land Management

Monies received from
Section 3 grazing
"districts"

17.5\ to

PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control

counties

Monies received from
Section 15 grazing

50% to
counties

PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control

Federal Power Act
(16 u.s.c. 810)
Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission

Monies received from
occupancy and use of
federal lands

37.5% to state

No state allocation law--monies go to the State General Fund

Payment in Lieu of Taxes

Annual appropriations
allocated to local

I
U1

I

(16

u.s.c.

6901)

Bureau of Land Management

Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act
(43 u.s.c. 1337(g))
Minerals Management
Service

governments

Lease revenues from
offshore tracts within
3 miles of the state's
seaward boundary

No state allocation law--monies paid directly to counties
75c per federal
acre less revenue
sharing funds or
lOc per federal acre
with no deductions;
both have ceiling
amount based on
population
"fair and

equitable"
share of
common pools

No state allocation law--disputed monies being held in escrow account.

Collected Nationwide
California Escrow Account
Federal
to

2

(RS)

%)

• FY 83

California received
(allocated to counties, schools
and the state)

$55.6 Million

Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILT)

Fed. FY 83

California counties received

$10.1 Million

Total Payments

$65.6 Million

-6-

COUNTY DISTRIBUTION?
(Federal FY 1983)

County

Revenue
Sharinq

Alameda
0
$
Alpine
334,784
Amador
303,819
Butte
235,820
Calaveras
82,925
Colusa
67,919
Contra Costa
0
Del Norte
662,386
El Dorado
1,889,738
Fresno
675,676
Glenn
194,285
Humboldt
478,733
Imperial
192,414
In yo
672' 918
Kern
214,984
Kings
2,142
Lake
1,149,160
Lassen
1,355,965
Los Angeles
207,764
Madera
259,110
Marin
0
Mariposa
145,923
Mendocino
218,678
Merced
688
Modoc
666,504
Mono
322,800
Monterey
23,298
Napa
1,136
Nevada
340,706
Orange
22,256
Placer
755,158
Plumas
1,554,329
Riverside
27,471
Sacramento
0
San Benito
9,530
San Bernardino
371,338
San Diego
65,734
San Francisco
0
San Joaquin
0
San Luis Obispo
49,878
San Mateo
0
Santa Barbara
43,245
Santa Clara
19,198
Santa Cruz
0
Shasta
998,463
Sierra
788,254
Siskiyou
2,576,939
Solano
0
Sonoma
703,937
Stanislaus
303
Sutter
0
Tehama
732,311
Trinity
1,299,369
Tulare
497,953
Tuolumne
590,301
Ventura
38,629
Yolo
1,135
Yuba
70,293

PILT
$

1,319
38,342
8,268
14,178
14,350
9,502
1,060
43,465
49,437
256,172
19,277
1,488,546
648,379
485,741
589,442
5,414
35' 724
155,342
476,300
87,533
108,687
153,020
29,235
28,788
159,310
161,239
268,112
42,778
17,520
19,136
33,830
108,867
917,520
3,030
78,705
759,237
310,022
12,470
881
228,276
0
450,778
5,079
0
90,650
40,349
236,162
3,271
2,339
3,405
113
41,749
141,885
658,422
111,992
448,337
19,501
4,658

-7-

Total
PILT & RS
$

1,319
373,126
312,087
249,998
97,275
77,421
1,060
705,851
1,939,175
931,848
213,562
1,967,279
840,793
1,158,659
804,426
7,556
1,184,844
1,511,307
684,064
346,643
108,687
298,943
247,913
29,476
825,814
484,039
291,410
43,914
358,226
41,392
788,988
1,663,196
944,991
3,030
88,235
1,130,575
375,756
12,470
881
278,154
0
494,023
24,277
0
1,089,113
828,603
2,813,101
3,271
706,276
3,708
113
7741060

1,441,254
1,156,375
702,293
486,966
20,636
74,951

Federal
Payments
as a % of
County
Rt:: '""lues
.0003
15.69
2.742
.4405
.7890
.7255
.0004
6.339
4.517
.3247
1. 762
3.554
1. 907
8.552
.2695
.0188
4.492
1:?.12
.0186
1. 092
.1248
3.610
.6467
.0363
11.79
3.993
.2679
.1200
1. 350
.0067
1. 256
13.89
.2848
.0007
• 9372
.2566
.0544
.0007
.0004
.3841

o.o

.3720
.0048

o.o

1. 777
22.63
12.11
.0037
.5359
.0027
.0004
3.885
15.61
.8359
3.704
.2246
.0371
.2952

In the long term, federal land revenue sharing funds should
grow
tantially as
and accelerated resource development occurs both onshore and o
and as 2.5 million acres of
l

ral

s

California are opened up for miner-

' fore

and other development as a result of the 1984 Cali8
Wilderness
11 compromise signed by the President.

forn

However, the following federal actions are significantly undercutti

state revenue sharing from federal lands:

California is losing or is threatened with the loss of
millions of dollars in federal land revenues as a result
of:
•

the federal government's refusal to provide states
with a "fair and equitable" share of offshore oil and
gas revenues;

•

federal mineral royalty mismanagement1

•

mineral leasing "lottery• scandals;

•

federal agency "undervaluation" of gas production;

•

illegal deductions of federal "windfall profits"
taxes from state revenue shares;

•

federal proposals to reduce the state share of revenues from federal land timber harvesting and grazing:
and

•

federal government use of "appropriation bills" to
circumvent federal land laws requiring state revenue
sharing.

California is being seriously harmed by federal government
incompetence as well as intentional federal efforts to reduce
state and local shares of federal land revenues.

The threat of

continued federal land law revenue sharing losses becomes all the
more serious as the deficit-ridden, revenue-hungry federal government seeks to reduce state and local financial assistance
possible.

-8-

California must

st the further erosion of its

share of federal land
d s

icular, counties and school

cts dependent on

cant

revenues will be signifi-

if revenue

ses continue.

to maintain existing

s,

Whi

-.;vork

state must also ensure

monies due to the federal government from federal land
development, and thus due

part to the state because of reve-

nue sharing requirements, are
This report describes
of vast federal land ho

fact fully paid.
burdens imposed by the presence
in

offshore California, sum-

marizes federal land revenue sharing programs and related state
, reviews recent state actions to assess the economic impact
of federal lands in Cali

, identifies specific problems

causing or threatening to cause offshore oil and gas, onshore
ral leasing, fores

, grazing, and other federal land reve-

nue losses for the state, and provides recommendations for state
act
u

In addition to

led proposals to address the partic-

r problems cited above, the report includes general recommen-

dations to establish a comprehens

state mechanism to monitor

and influence federal land decisions having major land use and
fiscal impacts:

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
I.
II.

Create a FEDERAL LANDS COORDINATION OFFICE
Create a FEDERAL LANDS ADVISORY COUNCIL

-9-

II.

BACKGROUND 9

Impact of Federal Lands In California
Federal lands generally are intermixed with state and private lands and make up a major portion of the state's real
estate.

Consequently, their use significantly affects the use

of adjoining lands.

Federal land activities often cause substan-

tial development pressures on nearby communities, with increased
demand for transportation, education, police and fire protection,
and other public services.
Minerals, energy and forest development on federal land are
sometimes accompanied by increases in population, local economic
readjustments, degradation in water and air quality, losses of
recreational opportunities, and "boom-bust" towns.

In addition,

federal livestock grazing and range improvement decisions often
influence the long-term stability of local ranching communities.
Similarly, federal offshore energy development causes environmental and economic consequences along the coast, which affect
tourism, recreation, commercial and sport fishing, and other
segments of the state's economy.
The dominant and sometimes oppressive character of federal
land decisions is exacerbated by the fact that many counties in
which federal ownership is significant tend to have small populations and lack a significant tax base.

With limited financial

resources to spare, some counties are unable to contend with
federal land issues.

As a consequence, the vast amount of fed-

eral land holdings in California often frustrates local government self-determination.

-10-

Federal Assistance Programs Related to Federal Lands
States do not have
the

power to tax federal property despite

on state and

to the

1 j

sdictions to

s

as well as to the general public using

1
1

owned property.

In

1

compensate states and local governments for

to this inequ

, and to

s and the loss of self-determination, several pieces of
1 legislation have been enacted to provide financial aid.
These

fall into two

1.
2.

s:

Federal revenue sharing programs, and
Payments in lieu of taxes (PILT)

Furthermore, pursuant to the re

powers of the states under
the Constitution, states may impose severance and other taxes on
private
ssees operating on federal lands. 10
This constitutional and statutory framework influences the
annual

stribution of billions of dollars of revenues generated

from federal lands.
federal revenue

The bulk of California

s are

programs related to onshore

1, gas

geothermal development, fertilizer mineral production, timber
harvests, offshore oil and gas leasing (currently held up in an
escrow account) , and the PILT program.

-11-

F1IDERAL MID CALIFOIUUA LAWS OONCERIIII'JG F1IDERAL REVENUE SHARING

11

Federal Law/Agency

Type of Receipts

State Share

California Law

Mineral Leasing Act
(30 u.s.c. 191)
Bureau of Land Management

Revenues received from

50\ to state

mineral leasing (oil, gas,
geothermal, potash, etc.)

Public Resources Code (PRC) 2795--the first $1. c million to be deposited in
Surface Mining and Reclamation Account
PRC 3821--requlres 40% of the state's share of geothermal revenues to go to
counties of origin for geothermal related activities
PRC 3822--requires 30% of geothermal revenues to be granted or loaned by the
Energy Commission to local governments for geothermal projects
PRC 3825--requires 30% of geothermal revenues to go to the Renewable Resources
Investment Fund (PRC 34000) for natural resource and wildlife projects
PRC 12304-07--requires federal potash and potassium revenues to be distributed to
affected school districts and community colleges
Education Code 12320--all other Mineral Leasing Act monies go to the State School Fund

National Forest
Management
(16 u.s.c. 500)
U.S. Forest Service

Monies received
from
National Forests
(timber sales,
recreation fees)

25% to
counties

Government Code 29484--apportioned 50% to county school service funds and
50% for county roads

I
N

Taylor Grazing Act
(43 u.s.c. 315i)
Bureau of Land Management

Federal Power Act
(16 u.s.c. 810)
Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
Payment in Lieu of Taxes
(16 u.s.c. 6901)
Bureau of Land ~~nagement

Monies received from
Section 3 grazing
"districts 11

12.5% to
counties

PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control

50% to

PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control

Monies received from
Section 15 grazing

counties

Monies received from

37.5!!i, to state

No state allocation law--monies go to the State

C~neral

Fund

12

occupancy and use of
federal lands

Annual appropriations
allocated to local
governments

No state allocation law--monies paid directly tc counties
75¢ per federal
acre less revenue
sharing funds or
lOc per federal acre

13

with no deductions;

both have ceiling
Rfllount based on

population
Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act
(43 u.s.c. l33i(g))
~inerals Management
Service

Lease revenues from
offshore tracts within
3 miles of the state's
seaward boundary

Hfair and
equitable 11
share of
common pools

No state

allocatic~n

law--disputed monies being held in escrow account.

r--1
I

Lands
Some states

sting federal revenue
of equ

states and

com-

ss of self-

, reduced tax revenues,
ral lands, and

to

In 1980, Cal
to ef

in full control over

pas

modest way, formal
rm

caused
AB 2302

(Hayes)

, in

"Sagebrush Rebellion"
s to wrest ownership of publ
1

the federal

AB 2302

the

lands from

the State Lands

ssion, Attorney General, Governor's Office of Planning and
Research, and Department of

and Game to joint

study of California

by the Bureau of Land Management

(BLM) with a view towards

state ownership of such lands.
General's Office

A

to AB 2302 concluded

doomed to failure.

re

ion was
de

s

of

15

This
Court of

a federal 9th Circu

ruled against Nevada's c

1983

to

1 lands

AB 2302 cal

j

a

ted to the Governor
to the question of
was to address local

In addi-

and costs associated with current and
s.

In May of 1982 a "draft"
and the Federal Lands:

document focused

rnatives for State
attention was paid to fisca

to

ownership and control, the

was issued entitled
ions for state

agency

by January 1, 1982.

s

future BLM land mana

on

of

forts to secure state

1 lands were most
d

conduct a

ly

1 land management; only minor

issues.

be submitted.
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A final report has yet to

In

SB 1726 (Keene) 17 whi

984, Cali

quires

Director of Forestry to prepare a

st and range-

,January 1,

land resources

ch must

an assessment

s
land and

ls with
economic

relude

respect to

The legislation not only

issues,

also calls for an evaluation of

fits and costs.
i

Also in 1984,
),

legislature passed SB 1673

the Governor to coordinate a process to
1 government

1

menting on federal o

ipation in reviewing and comleasing

The bill also establi

a

development proposals.

1 government energy advisory

committee charged with making recommendations to the Governor
concern

the development of coastal energy resources and the
of coastal tourism and

I

1

s fishing and other competing economic interests.
18
ernor vetoed the bill.
An understanding of
"

Sagebru

problems as

with

Robbery" will provide the state with a
s which focus on preventing

new init
of mill
1

Gov-

of dollars of offshore and

revenues.
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III.

STATE LOSSES OF

ENERGY

) of the Outer
1
f 1978
coastal states a
of

to a

three miles of the
les of

geological structures
1 and state

and
revenues

tracts leased

state's
tracts

Act

s,

oil and

I

lf (OCS)

)

,

those

ls of oil) common to
If the Department of the

1

and a coastal state governor cannot

a

iated

on a division of these revenues, the Interior Department may

with

sing

is

escrow OCS revenues from the 3-6
an

red to place into

le tracts

as

1

or a federal district court

the al

of funds
been

Since 1978,
t"h Ca i

over 8(g)
In

s.

grown

escrow accounts

enormous

to over

1

shared
and
Texas
a

ch
t

ifornia.

the

on

states' revenue

factors,
to

s

" of
acent state

ion

all re
sing revenues
ing whi

1 leases more va

rna

under

to

"
1 lessees.

adjacent

must re

s issue,

OCS Lands Act states are on
" of state

-15-

entit

1 and gas reserves by

was recent

The Texas pos

state a 50% share of "enhanced"
20
to $335 mil
Under
Texas

court which
s revenues
may

Cali
of

a

ifornia submerged lands

formation about nearby federal
21
value of those federal tracts.

, thereby
However, Cali

s not appear to be

liz

Following the Texas decision, the Secretary

s opportunity.

of

to a

gas development activities

l

va

on

c

state can prove that previous

" bonus revenues if

11

approved by a federal dis-

coastal states a settlement equalling

of

16 2/3% of bonuses and rental payments, plus interest, for leased

in the 3-6 mi

zone.

Under this proposal, Ca

fornia

Federal Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Escrowed Revenues
Collected Nationwide
California Escrow Account
Federal Offer (16 2/3%)
were not
to

Department's court-rejected proposal
of roya

states a
11

to have been "
conta

offer, but instead were to be

of

under the

al

$5.3 billion
$1.3 billion
$217 million

s from oil and gas determined

from state submerged lands.

In addition,

conditions which could inhibit state chal-

s to the size of offshore lease sales, thus opening the door
to overzealous "

sa

II

ing, flooding the market with

tracts and generating
After rc;presentatives from seven coastal states met to discuss

of

, including four Governors

(California was repre-

of Environmental Affairs), it was conas

and rejected by all states with the sole
.
b e1ng
.
c a l'f
. 22
except1on
1 orn1a.
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(a) The Legislature should ask the Governor for a report
on the status of OCS 8(g) negotiations, and should
specifically
explanation of why California's position
other coastal
states ..
(b) The Governor should
a lawsuit against the
Department of the Interior if the S(g) offer is
determined to be inadequate and negotiations break
down.
{c) The Legislature
develop legislation to allocate future OCS 8(g) funds received by the state.

The •seaweed Rebellion• OVer OCS Revenue Sharing
On September 13, 1984,

House of

312-94 a conference report on

s.

sentatives adopted

246 , a bill which gives all

coastal states and territories 4% of OCS revenues, up to $300
million a year, for block grants to
coastal research,
. . .
opment ac t 1v1t1es.

23

state and local programs

, planning, management and develc a 1 1. f orn1a
.
.
wou ld rece1ve
a b ou t
m1. 1 -

from this program if it is established.

The Reagan

Administration opposes the bill and threatened a veto.

On Octo-

ber 9, 1984, Senators in support of the President's position
threatened a filibuster, and the bill died in the Senate.
While OCS Lands Act B(g) funds are intended to benefit
on

a few states with

mile belt, OCS revenue

ral OCS leasing in the adjacent 3-6
ring

slation is based on the

that a modest portion of federal revenues derived
from the extraction of publ
e

owned, non-renewable offshore

resources should

reinvested in all coastal states for
the sound management of renewable coastal resources. 24
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The Seaweed Rebels who support the legislation point out that
the Reagan Administration has reduced or eliminated funding for
state coastal programs (e.g., Coastal Zone Management, Coastal
Impact Assistance, Sea Grant Research, Fisheries Management) at the same time that it has accelerated and expanded its
OCS

sing program, which is expected to generate an estimated

$6 billion in FY 1985.

In California, the Department of the

Interior has plans to open up for oil and gas leasing 59 million
25
acres offshore from Mexico to the Oregon border.
While the benefits of OCS leasing are spread across the
nation, socioeconomic and environmental risks are concentrated
local

Without federal assistance, most state and local gov-

ernments will be hard pressed to plan for and manage development associated with offshore energy activities.

Federal funding

is also needed to build on the progress made to date in state
coastal research, education, management, protection and fisheries
programs.

Supporters also point out that as a matter of fairness

and equity, OCS revenue sharing would bring coastal states and
affected local governments into partial conformity with their
counterparts who receive a share of onshore federal oil and
gas revenues under the Mineral Leasing Act.

Furthermore, while
26
states may impose severance taxes on federal lands onshore,
the
27
OCS Lands Act prohibits state taxation of offshore minerals.

OCS Revenue Sharing Recommendation
(a) The state should continue to support legislation
to estab~~sh an OCS revenue sharing block grant
program.
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0%

i-

s
i-

from
1

Mineral Royalty Fraud and Mismanagement
Serious deficiencies
royal

the federal government's mineral

s

resulted in hundreds of mi

lions of dollars in losses, representing as much as a 10% royalty
shortfall.

This has been enormously costly to public land states

because for every dollar of underpayment, states lose fifty
cents.
In response to widespread reports of theft of federal oil,
industry failure to report oil production and federal agency
mismanagement of onshore oil royalty collection, the Linowes
Commission on the Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy
Resources was established in 1981 by the Department of the Interior.
The following year the commission issued a report 30 conrming serious deficiencies including:

•
•
•
•
•

failure to verify production data;
failure to maintain adequate accounting records;
failure to impose penalties for late payments;
failure to require adequate site security;
chronic understaffing.
nowes Commission recommended a strengthened royalty manage-

ment system and increased coordination with states.
Passage of the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of
982 established a framework for efficient royalty management and
31
a basis for federal-state coordination.
The Act provides for:
•

"cooperative" federal-state audit agreements;

•

the "delegation" to states of federal royalty management
authority;

•

"compensation" for state cooperative agreements and delegations;

-20-

•

0

netted
F'rom

8

Al

federal law authorizes

1 state reimbursement for

auditing costs, under recently issued federal
regu

lty management

only 50% of state co ts incurred pursuant to "cooper-

at

audit agreements"
s means that states

share

11
11 not

will be augmenting
'
34
asslstance.

au d
While

by

federal government.
their full 50% revenue

federal budget by providing free

good news is that the regulations call for 100%

reimbursement

costs associated

th federal "delegations" to

states of roya

management authority, the bad news is that the

federal government has been slow in implementing a delegation
program.

No funds have been requested for delegations, and the

meager sum of only $1.5

llion is being sought in FY 1985 to pay

for up to 8 cooperative agreements,
e

state
35
government.

to the suspicion that

icipation is not welcomed

the federal

than establishing a constructive working relationship,
cooperative agreements have le
State auditors
i

states frustrated and upset.

been discovering unrecorded oil and gas pro-

wells, late payments

interest paid, supposedly

shutdown wells in production, proposals to "write-off" royalty
s

r $100,000, and other costly deficiencies.
sal to

neptness

Federal

formation, and general resistance
have undermined cooperative efforts to

to state
remedy these

s.

36

s situation has raised the question, "If

One
1 and gas roya

s are

a mess, what other resource based
37
revenue programs are affected?"
Between 1980-84, California
received over $16 million in federal geothermal leasing revenues
and over $15 million from federal potash development, and the
annual state revenue
audits have ever

from these minerals are rising.

No

performed on geothermal or potash royalties

to verify that the proper amount of royalties has been paid to
state.
access

In August 1984, the State Controller requested audit
these resources.
-22-

(b)

Congress federal approthe state for •delegated"
should also urge the Department
Interior to issue federal regulations
which
100% reimbursement for st~~e costs
associated with •cooperative agreements.•

(c) State royalty management
extended beyond onshore
to
other federal resource revenue
geothermal,
,
, etc .. )
if it is determined that federal mismanagement
other resource sectors
causing significant losses
in state or
revenue shares.

-23

1 Leas

Under the

Act, the oil and gas leasing pro-

cess differs depending on
cons

Is

to be part of a "

an unknown deposit.
peti

bidding.

are

geologic structure"

(KGS) or

KGS areas are accessible only through comLands that lie outside a KGS are generally

leased through a noncompetitive lottery system.

In the lottery

system, anyone submitting a $75 entry fee and willing to pay a
$1 per acre annual rental

may enter and possibly win a lease.

Nationally, about 97% of all mineral leasing is done through the
lottery system.

In FY 83, of the 396 oil and gas leases issued

by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in California, 395 were
noncompetitive.
A major problem with the lottery is that

deprives the

federal treasury and state governments of substantial amounts
of money because highly valuab
leased for a song.
mill

mineral deposits have been

Errors in KGS determinations have cost states

of dollars.

For example, in 1983, BLM leased tracts in

adjacent to producing oil wells through the lottery for
r acre rental
reass

Two-thirds of the leases were then

to energy companies for huge sums.

mated

It has been

esti-

leases were worth $50-$100 million, and the

state lost half that value due to the lottery.
A similar error cost the State of Arkansas $30 million
a
$1

BLM leased 33,000 acres of valuable oil and gas lands
acre.

Adjacent tracts were being sold for $4000 per acre.

Arkansas successfully sued BLM to cancel the leases arguing that
BLM

breached its obligation to protect the state's 50% share
of revenues. 39 While no one can be certain about the scope of
the problem, a public and congressional outcry over extensive
fraud and abuse led to a temporary suspension of the lottery in
40
1983.
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The

ss

1

s concluded that the fed-

eral government could

increase its mineral revenues

el
t

to a
b

al

net rece

s
per year,

00

to public land states.

Feder a

in the face of Admin-

opposition.
is

BLM, which

the $75

1 Leasing Act formula.

share in

received

$90 million a year, is not

th states
filing

th half

slation was

1983 to e

istrat

system,

$

per acre annual rental.

covers admini

statutory revenue sha

red
States

BLM argues that its

costs and is not subject to the
requirement.

However the fees greatly

exceed administrative costs

appear to be used as a

federal revenues at

of the states.

Lottery Recommendations
(a) As long as the lottery continues, the state should
seek authority to review selectively noncompetitive
proposals prior to leasing to ensure that valuable
mineral reserves are not leased for less than fair
market value. The state should negotiate an agree~
ment with the BLM to obtain geologic information,
well activity in the vicinity, and other pertinent
information, and should examine adjacent state and
private leasing activity when appropriate.
(b) The state should support federal legislation to
secure a 50% share of
lottery filing fees, and
also consider joining other states in a test case
challenging the withholding of these funds.
(c) California should support federal legislation to
eliminate the lottery and replace it with an all
competitive leasing system.
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ce to

Natural gas

on federal

ses

California

the

1 Leas
1 and gas

revenue

re

revenue

now under

new
va

1

natural gas

Cali

which cou

states
revenues.

"contract

cost

of dollars in

42

The new

," rej

se value on

current

of using the

highest price of gas at nearby wells
t

is

the same general produc-

area.
The problem with the new gu

is that

1

majority of

gas contracts are not "arms
contracts are
the

af
ce of

80% of the
an

s

1

s low.

The proposed guidel

ft the burden to government to prove
s not ref

underpayment, and

11 worsen as gas

making to

the "contract price"

that gas undervaluation has

or cause of

proposal

s would

va

Linowes

75% o f a 11

st

the prob-

s rise by 1990 to represent about

s pal. d . 43
~

The Department

+

o~

.
t h e Inter1or

this warning and exacerbates the problem.
the

guide

s is scheduled to take

of 1984.

Natural Gas Valuation Recommendation
(a) California should oppose the proposed guidelines
natural gas valuation, and if necessary should
support federal legislation or join in a judicial
action against the Department of the Interior to
overturn the guidelines.
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Ru

Government
The

1 crude oi

t_o recoup

tax

1

and

ene

1982

federal

13% of all

s revenues,

th $163.6

U.S. Treasury

11
ral

s the federal windfall pro

ss

the sta

share.

the Mineral Leasing Act.

practice to
and gas

testing

i

ssees,

s

of the tax from gross

state's 50% entit
Act.

A

1

favor of the state; the case is on appeal.

court

,

To
auditors

1 governtaxes in excess

II

As a result, states were
i

fall

IS

of over $26
ling

$1.25 mil-

Recommendation
(a)

support New Mexico's litigation
should consider actions to secure remelegis
if
litigation is not
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45

by state

'.j-

1 .....

of Western states

rnent has
1

application of this

that the deduct
1 Leas

$50

The State of

state's share of royalties paid by federal oil

revenue

f

s'

states of the

full 50%
has

ts

Backdoor Federal Appropriation Maneuvers

In FY 84 and FY 85
through

rtment of the
s admini

attempted
costs of

revenues prior to the distrilty management
In other words, states would
bution of the states' 50%
r~ceive 50% of net
than gross revenues.
In effect,
through appropriation
, the Interior Department sought
to indirectly amend the Mineral Leasing Act's revenue sharing
formu
This
maneuver wou
state revenues by
about $15 mill
Thus far Congress

California losing about $1 million.
s rejected these proposals.

Similarly, the federal government has unsuccessfully
attempted to fund the Payment
of Taxes (PILT) program
from mineral royalties, again seeking to reduce
share. The PILT program is current
funded
nues through annual appropriations.

states'
general reve-

The Reagan Administration

consistently opposed the PILT program, and budget appropriations are always uncertain.

Appropriation Recommendation
(a) California should oppose federal government appropriation
lls which seek to diminish the states•
50% Mineral Leasing Act share by deducting royalty
management and PILT program costs from mineral royalties prior to distribution to the states.
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V.
PROTECTING CALIFORNIA 1 S SHARE OF
NATIONAL FOREST AND RANGEI.AND REVENUES

Over 6 million acres of National
Forest lands in California are managed

National Forest

for timber production, and this acre$43 million

will significantly increase with
the implementation of the 1984 Cali-

Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
In yo
Kern
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Madera
Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Nevada
Orange
Placer
Plumas
Bernardino
San Diego
San Luis Obispo
Santa Barbara
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Tehama
Trinity
Tulare
Tuolumne
Ventura
Yuba

604 t 261.43
319,554.62
591,879.89
265,723.21
120,210.98
1,309,636.20
2,001,665.04
1,759,377.45
346,907.52
964,296.61
480,974.43
293,530.95
470,987.30
3,349,528.08
148,596.10
715,586.97
435,122.33
325,394.43
2,248,026.31
500,965.95
19,949.74
572,025.26
15,755.99
1,150,659.19
3,973,495.28
70,486.48
188,887.41
21,133.23
12,373.40
41,191.79
3,733,690.62
1,352,471.32
4,912,384.45
1,820,388.26
4,521,851. 73
804,333.65
1,908,307.73
36,798.67
142,710.38

a Wilderness bill which opens
an additional 2.5 million acres for
development.

Twenty-five percent

(25%) of federal timber sale revenues
are distributed to the state for
ture on roads and schools in
counties producing the revenues,
the state received more than
State payments
sed on gross rather than net
--the base amount used to calstate revenues includes road

cu

construction and reforestation credits
provided to purchasers of timber.
These local government revenues are
now seriously threatened by a Reagan
Administration proposal to modify the
sting revenue sharing scheme.

The

President's FY 85 budget calls for a
legislative initiative to eliminate
the 25% revenue sharing formula and

with a system
and tax the federal
were

lands.

the value of nat

ing individual counties to assess
on its timber holdings as if they

Local assessors would be required to appraise
1 forest lands and apply state and local prop-

tax
-29-

Timber harvesting counties fear that under the proposed system they will receive only a fraction of the total money they
rece

under the current formula.
rn California conta

Many counties in central and

substantial federal forestlands, and

the 25% revenue share makes up a significant portion of total
county revenues.

Reductions in National Forest funds could seri-

ously impede their ability to maintain county roads, bridges and
schools.
The Reagan Administration argues that the new approach will
eliminate year-to-year revenue fluctuations, create equity among
counties with active timber harvesting and those with forest
lands used primarily for recreation, and eliminate school and
road earmarking requirements.

The Administration also maintains

that under their proposed program no county would receive less
than the average amount paid between 1977-1983.
The proposal appears to be simply another effort by the
Reagan Administration to reduce state revenue sharing under the
guise of providing counties with predictable, no-strings-attached
funds.

The Administration fails to mention that during the

1977-1983 revenue sharing base period, the forest products industry reduced production to the lowest level in the post-World War
II period while sufferring from the most sustained timber industry depression since the "Crash of '29".

Furthermore, the base

amount that each county is guaranteed is fixed, and its value
deteriorates over time with inflation.
As for the other alleged advantages, counties are able to
manage revenue fluctuations by earmarking forestry monies for
multi-year capital improvements rather than operating expenses,
and inequities among counties in federal land revenue sharing
payments are already factored into the Payments In Lieu of Taxes
program.

As for earmarking limitations, the schools and roads

limitations can be eliminated without modifying the 25% formula.
Furthermore, the proposed system would create an administrative
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nightmare, with county assessors charged with the responsibility
and costs of apprais
lands. 46

llions of acres of National Forest

Administration's proposal is further complicated by the
that California
l

s not impose a property tax on forest

Instead the state appl

s a Timber Yield Tax--a severance

tax on the volume of

harvested on both private and public
lands, including National Forest lands. 47 Thus, conceivably the

state would gain nothing from the proposal if it only authorizes
the application of
to forest lands.

sting state and local "property tax" laws
If the proposal provides the state with the

equivalent of the revenues generated by the Timber Yield Tax, the
benefits would be minimal as the state's timber severance tax
receipts are far less that the
received under the current
.
f
48
.
h
.
revenues h ar1ng ormula. ~
The temptat1on
would t.en
ar1se
to increase timber valuation to generate a greater tax

ld.

Resistance by the timber industry and tax assessment limitations
by Proposition 13, the tax-cutting measure passed by
California voters in 1978, would then come into play.
In the face of intense criticism, the Nat

1 Forest Service

has retreated from an immediate plan to introduce legislation,
tead has instituted a study to assess the impact of the
l in 40 counties nationwide, including 5 California couns

(Butte, Plumas, Los Angeles, Tulare and Humboldt).
Interestingly, the Administration's proposal comes at a t

when legislation has been introduced to increase state revenue
to 50% in recognition of the fact that in some counties
costs of building and maintaining the infrastructure to service national forest lands has been higher than the existing 25%
revenue share, and that the 50% share conforms to the Mineral
Leasing Act formula. 49 Fac
Administration opposition, the
slation failed to pass Congress this year.
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National Forest Lands Recommendations
(a) The state should actively monitor the Forest Service tax study and should continue to oppose legislation to impose a new local property tax scheme on
national forest lands, unless it can be demon~brated
that the state will be as well or better off.
(b) The state should support federal legislation to
increase the national forest land revenue sharing
formula to 50%.
(c) When implementing SB 1726 (Keene), which requires an
assessment and critique of federal policies regarding timberland management, the Director of Forestry
shou~d i~clude gytailed consideration of revenue
shar1ng 1ssues.

Potential Loss of Federal Grazing Land Revenues
In California, grazing by cattle, sheep and horses takes
place on 9 million acres of federal lands.

Most of this acre-

is in poor condition and in need of improvement to increase
forage.

The Taylor Grazing Act requires that

12~%

of revenues

obtained from Section 3 "grazing district" fees and 50% of revenues generated from Section 15 grazing on isolated tracts go to
the counties in which the lands are situated.

In 1983, Califor-

nia received about $150,000 as its share of grazing fees.

Reve-

nues were modest due in part to the poor condition of the range
and low fees.

State Share of
Federal Grazing Fees

FY 1983

Section 3
Section 15

$ 22,713
$127,010
$149,723

The current fee structure runs through 1985, at which time
the Administration must report to Congress with a recommended fee
52
schedule for subsequent years.
A report to Congress, to be
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tted jointly

the BLM and Forest Service, is scheduled for

completion in March 1985.

l

and December 1984
In a recent meeti

of

meetings will be held in Novemcomments.
Western

BLM distributed a
Eva

",which
process.

that all rangelands
fees or

slative Conference,
"Grazing Fee

and

scribed the grazing fee formula and
In discuss
not

report, the BLM stated
upgraded.

addi

Rather than adjust

to improve range

ivity, the

may be laying the

groundwork for allowing rangeland deterioration to continue.
It is also

ss

le that the federal government will consider

arrangements whereby

ing
ttees would receive a fee
ion for making range improvements. The problem with this

s

could reduce revenue di

is that imp

tions to counties if

receive a share of funds based on net
credit is deducted.

revenues computed after the pe
ever

What-

final outcome, a new fee system should promote the sta-

bility of family

and rural communit

upon federal

s

thout reducing county revenues.

Grazing Land Recommendations
(a) The state should support congressional appropriations for federal rangeland improvements to enhance
the value of the federal range and thereby increase
local revenue sharing.
(b) The state should
monitor the Administration's
to recommending changes in
the grazing fee structure after 1985.
(c) The state should support a federal grazing permittee
range improvement credit program only if the state
revenue share is based on gross revenues computed
prior to the
(which is how Forest Service
credits are handled).
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su
tant source of
1

s
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1

revenues.
1

of state
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revenues.
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not suf
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s
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to
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state

to

and coordination, there

needs to be better
local
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l support,
l
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If new
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se state
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. .
.
a d m1n1strat1ve costs.

state

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

I.

II.

a Federal Lands Coordinaand monitor major federal
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PROTECTING CALIFORNIA'S SHARE OF
NATIONAL FOREST AND RANGELAND REVENUES

National Forest Lands Recommendations
(1) The state should actively monitor the Forest Service tax study and should continue to oppose legislation to impose a new local property tax scheme on
national forest lands, unless it can be demonstrated
that the state will be as well or better off.
(2) The state should support federal legislation to
increase the national forest land revenue sharing
formula to 50%.
(3) When implementing SB 1726 (Keene), which requires an
assessment and critique of federal policies regarding timberland management, the Director of Forestry
should include detailed consideration of revenue
sharing issues.
Grazing Land Recommendations
(4) The state should support congressional appropriations for federal rangeland improvements to enhance
the value of the federal range and thereby increase
local revenue sharing.
(5) The state should actively monitor the Administration's activities related to recommending changes in
the grazing fee structure after 1985.
(6) The state should support a federal grazing permittee
range improvement credit program only if the state
revenue share is based on gross revenues computed
prior to the credit (which is how Forest Service
credits are handled).
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and management statutes to influence federal land decisions.
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influence over federal lands under the:
--Federal Land Policy and Management Act (43 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.)
--National Forest Management Act of 1976; Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1978 (16
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1600 et seq.)
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18.

Pursuant to the federal Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
local governments may submit their lease sale and development

recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior,

but must forward them through the Governor (43 U.S.C. 1345).
Local governments lobbied for SB 1673 after complaining
about inadequate federal public notice, hearing and consultation procedures which undermined their ability to participate effective

in offshore leasing decisions.

In the

Governor's letter returning the bill without signature, he
maintained that existing procedures for local government
participation were satisfactory.
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bers of the California Senate, on SB 1673, September 28,
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The California State Lands Commission

believes that despite the Texas court injunction, close to
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California escrow account by the Department of the Interior.
See "An Assessment of the Provisions of Section 8(g) Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 on Californ

's Share of Bonuses, Royalties and Other Revenues," Cali-

fornia State Lands Commission, July 1984.
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See 30 U.S.C. Section 1701 et seq.

32.

California v. Watt, Civ. No. 81-1217 (D.D.C. voluntarily
dismissed 1983).

California argued that the federal govern-

ment has a fiduciary duty to state recipients of federal
land revenue sharing to ensure that all past royalties were
accurately accounted for and collected.

The Secretary of

the Interior denied any obligation to federal lands states
other than to distribute 50% of whatever happened to be
collected from producers.

The lawsuit was settled by an

agreement in which the Interior Department reimbursed California for $500,000 toward the expenses of a cooperative
audit.
33.

Under the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of
1982, states are entitled to 50% of all interest collected
beginning in FY 1983-84.

The State Controller's Office

estimates that interest due California as of December 31,
1984 will be approximate
34.
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See final regulations implementing the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Management Act, 49 Federal Register 37336, September 21 , 1 9 8 4 .

35.

Some or all of the appropriated "cooperative agreement"
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See generally, Jan Stevens, "The Management of Mineral Royalties:
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the Western Office, Council of State
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Institute, p. 1 (1984).

funding is not provided to pay for

state auditing and other royalty management costs, the Legislature should consider raising needed funds by amending
Public Resources Code sections 3400-3403.
currently authorize oil

These provisions
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ing charges on federal production, to cover state administrative costs related to regulating oil and gas production.
California regulates the activities of federal oil and gas
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39.

Arkla v. Watt, 734 F.2d 347 {8th Cir. 1984).

The court's

decision was a major victory for states because it established state standing to challenge federal government leasdecisions which

ly affect state revenue shares.

See Alan Nevins, "Court of Appeals Decision in the Arkla v.
Watt Case: Growing Role of States in Federal Resource Administration," Summer 1984 WNRL Digest 32.
40.
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New Mexico v. Regan, Civ. No. 81-0452-M (D.C. N.M., June 8,

1983).
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Section 4986.

The court directed the federal government to provide

New Mexico with 50% of all future royalties from production
undiminished by the tax; the United States is to assume the
entire burden of the tax from its share.
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also granted past deficiencies plus interest.
46.
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federal lands was reviewed and confirmed in the report of
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